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RELIABILITY HISTORY OF THE APOLLO GUIDANCE COMPUTER
by
Eldon C. Hall
ABSTRACT
The APOLLO Guidance Computer was desigoed to provide the computation
necessary for guidance, navigation and eontr,_i of the Command Module and
the Lunar Landing Module of the APOLLO zpacecraft. The computer was
designed using the technology of the earls !o30's and the production was
completed by 1969. During thedevelopment, production.and operational phase
- of the program, the computer has accumulated a very interestinghistorywhich
is valuable for evaluating the tecnnology, production methods, system
, integration,and the reliabilityof the hardware. The operational experience
in the APOLLO guidance systems includes 17 computers which flew missions
and another 28 flighttype computers which are stillin va_'iousphases of
prelaunch activityincluding storage, system checkout, prelaunch spacecraft
checkout, etc.
These computers were manufactured and maintained under very strictquality
controlprocedures with requirements forreporting and analyzing allindications
of failure.Probably no other computer or electronic equipment with equivalent
complexity has been as well documented and monitored. Since it has
demonstrated a unique reliabilityhistory, it is important to e_aluate the
techniques and methods which have contributed to the high reliabilityof this
computer.
• *The operational experience includes missions through Apollo 15 which _lew
in August 1971. The compilation of allother data from thi_ repot, endec_ 31
December 1970.
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II. INTRODUCTION
The APOLLO guidance computer (AGC) is a real-time digital-control computer
whose conception and development took place in the early part of 1960. The
computer may be classified as a parallel, general-purpose or whole number
binary computer. This class of computer is representative of most of the
ground-based digital computers in existence in the late 1950s, when the
precursers of the AGC were being designed. Few computers of this class
had been designed by that time for the aerospace environment, and those few
embodied-substantial compromises in performance for the sake of conserving
space, weight, and power.
The computer is the control and processing center of the APOLLO Guidance,
Navigation and Control system. It processes data and issues discrete output
and control pulses to the guidance system and other spacecraft systems. An
operational APOLLO spacecraft contains two guidance computers and three
DSKYs (keyboard and display unit for operator interface), with one computer
and two DSKYs in the command module, and one of each in the lunar module.
The computers are electricalJy identical, but differ in the use of compu':er
software and interface control functions. As a control computer, some of _he
major functions are: alignment of the inertial measurement unit, processing
of radar data, management of astronaut display and controls and generation
of commands for spacecraft engine control. As a general purpose compute,',
the AGC solves the guidance and navigation equations required for the lunar-
mission.
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2• DEVELOPMENT
The principal features of the electrical and mechanical design of the AGC
were shaped by the nebulou_ constraints of the APOLLO program (unknown i:,
computational capacity, reliability, space, weight, and power) and the technology
available to digital designers. The AGC evolved from these constraints and _
thgdevelopment of mission requirements rather than from a fixed specification
generated a priori. The desire for reliability beyond the state-of-the-art in
digital computers was one of the most important drivin& _orces which impacted
the development and production of the computer. From this evolutionary ,:
process two designs resulted which were used operationally. The Block I
. computer was used on three unmanned spacecraft development flights, and .:
the Block II was used on one unmanned Lunar Module flight and all manned
flights. ThemaJor topics of interest are the Block II design and the techniques
developed during the earlier phase which have impacted the computer design
and reliability•
2,1 COMPUTER DESIC_
The first version of the Block I computer emerged in late 1962 with integrated
circuit logic, wired-in (fixed) ._rogram memory, coincident*current erast le
memory, and discrete-component circuits for the oscillator, power 8uppll %
certain built-in test circuits, interfaces, and memory electronics. The final
Block I computer was packaged using welded interconne_tions within modules
which were interconnected with automatic wire-wrap.
'!i[! This design had very limited capabilities due to the constraint on physical
, size and the desire for high reliability. The instrvo,'_on repertoire, word
.-.|
length, and number of erasable memory cells werp _ 'imited. Provision
• was made, however, for a moderately large an,_uv _ ,f fixed memory for
3
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instructions and constants. A high density memory of the read-only type,
called a rope memory, had been developed earlier to meet the goals of small
physical size and high reliability and was carried over into the design of the
APOLLO computer.
The ropememory, beinga transformertype,dependsforitsinformationstorage
onthepatternswithwhichitssensingwiresarewoven atthetimeofmanufacture.
Once a ropememory isbuilt,itsinformationcontentisfixedand isunalterable
by electricalexcitation. The high densityand the informationretention
characteristicswere the featuresthatmade itattractivefortheAGC. Other
technologicaldevelopmentswhich supportedthe AGC development were: 1.
insemiconductortechnology,where silicontransistorsprogressed to planar
forms, thenepitaxialform, and eventuallytomonolithicintegratedcircuits,
2.incoincident-currentmemories withlow temperature coefficientlithium-
ferrite cores for operation over a broad temperature range, 3. in packaging
techniques, with the introduction of welded interconnection, multilayer printed
circuit, and machine wirewrapping. These developments allowed significant
: reductionsinvolume and weightwhilecoincid_ntlyenhancingreliability.These
packaging techniques were reduced to practice and had been used by MIT/DL
:, in the development of the POLARIS guidance computer.
Integrated circuRs were in development by the semiconductor industry during
the late 1950s under Air Force spor, sorship. In late 1961, MIT/DL evaluated
a number of integrated circuits for the APOLLO guidance computer. An
integrated circuit equivalent of the prototype APOLLO computer was
constructed and tested in mid- 1969 to discover any problem s the circuits might
:_ exhibitwhen used in largenumbers. Reliability,power consumption,noise
generation,and noise susceptibilitywere the primary subjectsof concernin
theuseofintegratedcircuitsintheAGC. The performance oftheunitsunder
evaluationwas sufficienttoJustifytheirexclusiveuse forthelogicsectionof
the computer.
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. 2.2 DISPLAY AND KEYBOARD DESIGN
As an adjunct to the APOLLO guidance computer, a display and keyboard unit
was required as an information interface with the crew. The original design
was made during the latter stages of development of the first version oi the
Block I computer, at which time neon numeric indicator tubes of the "Nixie"
variety were used to generate three 4-digit displays for information, plus
three 2-digit displays for identification. These were the minimum considered
necessary, and they provided the capability of displaying three-vectors with
sufficient precision for crew operatior, s. The 2-digit indicators were used to
display numeric codes for verbs, nouns, and program numbers. The verb-noun
format permitted communication in language with syntax similar to that of
spoken language. Examples of verbs were "display"o "monitor", "load", and
"proceed", and examples of nouns were "time", "gimbal angles", "error
" indications", and "star identification number." A keyboard was incorporated
along with the display to allow the entering of numbers and codes for identifying
" them.
2.3 FINAL DESIGN
The Block II computer design (see Figure 1), resulting from the changes in
technology and better definition of mission requirements since the Block I
design, roughly doubled the speed, raised between 1.5 and 9 times the memory
capacity, increased input/output capability, decreased size, and decreased
power consumption. In addition the mechanical design included features which
provided for moisture proofing and easy access to the six fixed memory
modules. The design intent was to permit changing the memory inflight if
the mission required more memory.
• The final DSKY design incorporated three 5-digit registers and three 2-digit
registers using segmented electroluminescentnumeric displays, a 19-element
keyboard with characters lighted with electroluminescent panels, and a$
5
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FIGURE 1
AGC CHARACTERISTICS
t PERFORMANCE
CHARACTERISTICS BLOCK I BLOCK II
I.
Word Length 15 Bits + Parity 15 Bits + Parity
Number System One's Complement One's Complement
Fixed Memory Registers 24,576 Words 36,864 Words
Erasable Memory Registers 1,024 Words 2,048 Words
Number of Normal Instructions I1 34
Number of Involuntary Instructions 8 10
(Interrupt, Increment, etc.)
Number of Interrupt Options 5 10
Number of Interface Counters 20 29
Number of Interface Circuits 143 227 "
Computer Clock Accuracy 0.3 ppm 0.3 ppm
Memory Cycle Time 11.7 sec 11.7 sec
Counter Increment Time 11.7 sec 11.7 sec
Addition Time 23.4 sec 23.4 sec
Multiplication Time 117 sec 46.8 sec
Divide Time 187.2 sec 70.2 sec
Double Precision Addition Time 1.65 millisec 35.1 sec
(subroutine)
_![ Number of Logic Gates 4°100 5,600
r[
. Volume 1,21 cubic ft, 0.97 cubic ft.
:1 Weight 87 pounds 70 pounds
Power Consumption 85 watts 55 watts
J
6
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. 14-legend caution and status display lighted with filamentary bulbs. The displays
were switched under control of the computer using a matrix of 120 miniature
relays some of which were latching in order to provide memory for the display
elements.
3. RELIABILITY APPROACHES
L
Many approaches were taken to assure that the computer would realize the _
reliabilityrequirements of the mission. The requirement for the AGC was a
mission success probability of (Ps)=0.998. Early approaches which were
studied included: 1. built-in test for fault detection, 2. in-flight repair, 3.
dual computers with manual switchover, 4.a powered-down mode of operation
called standby, 5. electricaland mechanical d_.signsthat left large margins
_bove expected operating conditions, 6. an emphasis on reliabilityof i!
components, testing procedures, and manufacturing. Of these approaches the
• concept of in-flight repair and dual computers was discarded after the
configuration of the spacecraft was modified to provide for crew safety backups _:
in the case of guidance failures. The mission success probability for the
AGC remained the same however. ,
3.1 FAULT DETECTION AND RESTART '::
The computer's abilitytodetec_ faultsusing built-intest circuitswas provided "'°
since it was known that digital equipment was very sensitive to transient
disturbances and that a method of recovery from transient faults was very ,:-
desirable. In the early designs these c_rcuitsand the self-checking software
were necessary to accomplish the fault location required for in-flight repair. _
The circuits and the software were simplified for the final Block II AGC.
Typical built-in tests include: a RUPT lock (too long in interrupt mode), TC
t
trap {transfer of control to self address), parity fail (a parity bit is appended
in everyword in r_._moryand is tested on all _ransfers to CPU), night watchman
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alarm (a specified locationhas not been referenced often enough), and power
fail (the voltage has dropped below a predetermined level). The circuits
comprise two categorles: those that are derived logically,and those that are
derived using analog-type detection circuitry. The former circuitry is
distributedwithin the logicmodules of the computer and the latterin the alarm
module.
The outputs of these faultdetection circuitsgenerate a computer restart,that
is,transfer of control to a fixed program address. In addition,an indicator
display isturned on. Ifthefaultis transient innature, therestart will succeed
and the restart display can be cleared by depressing the reset (HSET) key.
Ifthe faultis a hard failure,the restart disulay willpersist and a switch to a
backup mode of operation is indicated.
3.2 ELECTROMAGNETIC TOLERANCE
Inadditiontothecircuitsto detect faults,considerable design effortand testing
was expended in order to make the computer very tolerant to externally
generated transient conditionsand electromagnetic interference (EMI). For
example, one test technique which was used to evaluate the shielding and
grounding was the use of electrostaticdischarges intothe computer case and
cabling of the system. After considerable testingand some significantchanges
in methods of grounding,the computer tolerated spark discharges to the case
and cabling without failure. This desire for EMI tolerance had an impact on
the cable shielding,the routing of wires within the computer, the interface
circuit design, the power supply design, and the signal grounding internal to
the computer.
3.3 DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
_s
The electricalo mechanical, and thermal designs for the AGC followed a
philosophy of overdesign, that is_ one of providing capability in excess of
identified requirements.
8
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In the area of electrical design, the general philosophy was to make circuits _
" as s_mple a_ possible, restrict the operating speed, minimize the c mponent
power consumption, and provide adequate operating rn_rgins when subjected
to extremes of power supply voltages and thermal environm _nts.
J
Standardizationofcircuitypeswas maximized attheexpenseoftotalcomponent
count. The use of severvldifferenttypesof circuitelements which would
tendtoreduce thetotalcomponent countwas avoided.
All components and circuitswere designed with very comfortableoperating ,'_
margins. These included: first,computer operating speeds which were ._
i_ constra,nedtobe wellwithinthe state=of-the-artofcorr,ponentsand circuits; i
second,circuitswhich were designed for low power operation,not only for
the purpose of conserving the total power, but also to keep the component
power dissipation within very comfortable nJargins. The designers were
•_ constantly confronted with a conflict between operating speed, power
consumption,and tolerancetovoltagemargins. Despite therequire1._entto
: minimize totalpower consumption,theresultingelectricaldesigntolerated
_: wide variations in power supply voltage.
i In the area of mechanical design,the Block IIcomputer utilizesmodular
constructionand wire wrapping fortheinterconnectionsofthe modules. The _,
! computer consist3of two major subassemblies or trays (Trays A and B) _
containing modules and interconnecting wiring. The trays _vith the covers
and gasketsprovidemechanical support,thermal controlviathe spacecraft
cold plate, environmental seal and shielding from electromagnetic interference. ',
The rope modules are plugged into the structure from outside the sealed case.
This permits program changes without breaking the environmental seal.
The module constructionis basicallywelded cordwood typeusing standard •
" components and integrated circr.its. In the case of the 24 logic modules, the
integrated circuit gates packaged in flatpacks are welded to multilayer boards
9
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for interconnection between gates. The rrodule frames provide mechanical
support and thermal control for the components in additior o tray interface
connector and jacki,_gscrews. :
The modules are partitioned between the two trays such that the logic, interface,
and power supply are in Tray A. The memo"y, memory electronics, analog
alarm circuits, and oscillator are in Tray S, in addition to the connectors
and mechanical support for the tray mounting the six rope modules.
The interconnecting wiring in the trays is accomplished by machine controlled
wire wrapping for a!_linterconnections. This technique provides a well /
controlled and easily reproduced method for making the large numbers of
interconnectionsrequired. In the computer there are about 15,000 connector
pins with an average of more than two connections per pin. After the wiring !
is complete, the trayis potted to provide mechanical support for the intercon- I
f
necting wires and connector pins.
In the area of thermal design, the temperature control of the computer was
achieved through conduction to the cold plate structure of the spacecraft.
Radiational cooling was minimized by the choice of finishes to meet the
requirements of spacecraft thermal control. Under some conditions, the
surfaces surrounding the computer were at a higher temperature than the
computer, thus causing additional heat _oads instead of providing radiational
cooling. In every case however, analysis indicated the effects of thermal
radiation could be ignored in the thermal design of the computer.
Since the total power consumption of the computer is relatively low, the thermal li
control was n_ainly one of distributing the heat load in the computer and !i
providing conduction paths to the cold plate. Module locations in the two trays i!
(A and B) were carefully selected. The two power supplies were located at ,
one wall in Tray A, where a short path and extra metal could be provided for I
the heat conduction to the cold plate. The E-memory, memory drivers, and i
10
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I sense amplifiers are located in the center of Tray B to provide temperature
- tracking of the temperature compensating circuits and the memory cores.
Conduction paths were provided from the electrical components to the base
of the modules and then into the wirewrap plate, where the heat fans out to "
the sides of the trays, and thus down the walls of the Tray A cover to interface
with the cold plate in the CM and with cold rafts in the LM. In the case of
the two switching transistors (NPN and PNP), thermal design included specifying
a special package. The package was the standard TO-18 case size but with a
solid metal header for decreased Junction-to-case temperature rise. At the
time of the Block II mechanical design, the solid metal header was not aw_ilable
in the TO-18 case size but had been used by semiconductor manufacturers on
other similar cases. Thus the thermal design provided conduction from the -
element dissipating heat, such as the transistor chip, through all the mechanical
interfaces to the cold plate.
r
r
The goals of the thermal design effort were: first, to ensure that the
_ temperature of components and especially semiconductors remained below .
i: 100oc under worst-case conditions. The seco_ld goal was to provide a _
reasonably uniform thermal environment between modu!es like the memory _"
electronics and logic modules. A temperature gradient between logic modules
would reduce the operating margins of the logic. Thermal measurements on -
the finished computer have verified that these goals were met. The measured
temperature difference between logic modules was less than 5oc and therefore
negligible. The temperature rise through the structure to the hottest components
: was low enough to maintain junction temperatures well below 100°C.
r_
y
Basic to *he success of the APOLLO guidance computer was the realization
: that conventional reliability practices were not sufficient to meet the reliability
requirement for the computer. An early estimate using fairly optimisitc
_ component failure rates and component counts, showed the resulting computer
-_. failure rate to be well above that which would be required to meet the computers
-_, 11
J
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_ _ apportionment of the mission success probability (Ps = 0.998). Under these
_ conditionsdesigners could use redundancy techniques or develov more reliable
/ components and manufacturing procedures in order to improve the reliability.
/
In the c_.se of the APOLLO computer various methods of accomplishing the
redundancy were studied. However none could be used and still meet the
power, size and weight requirements of the APOLLO mission. The elimination
of redundancy provided the motivation for improving reliability at all levels
of design, specification, manufacturing and testing, The tight assembly,
'_ inspection and test procedures during the manufacturing process detected
many problem s, each of which was closely monitored, and for which corrective
actions were developed. The resulting emphasis on quality has paid off by
decreasing the actual failure rates of the computer considerably below the
original estimates, even though the component count increased after the original
reliability estimates were made.
3.4 COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT
,v
During the early stages of the computer design, an effort was made to constrain
the number of different components to a selected few, thereby concentrating
the engineering effort required in the area of component development. These
constraints were rigidly adhered to _,nd were a constant source of complaints
_, from the circuit design engineers because they felt the limited number of
component types constricted their designs excessively. Not only the types of
partswere limited but also the range of values. For example, resistors were
limited to one type and to a tightly restricte_ number of different values.
The constraints were reviewed frequently and relaxed as new requirements
were Justified, but the existence of the constraints accomplished a greater
than normal degree of standardization. The benefits that resulted from the
effort to standardize were: (1) a reduction in the level of activity needed to
specify the components and t_,e level needed to develop testing methods that
were capable of continuously monitoring the quality of the components, (2) a
reduction in the efforts required to track the manufacturing problems that
12
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were related to a ccmponent defect or testing procedure, and (3) more important
to the reliability of the component was the large volume of procurements that
provided increased competition between vendore and greater motivation to
meet the reliability requirements.
Component selection was started in parallel with the development of circuit
designs. Initially the design engineers were required to specify the general
characteristics of the required components and the possible vendors for the
component. Then, after a vendor was selected, sample purchases and
engineering tests were made. One of the earliest and most important reliability
tests was an internal visual examination of the component in order to identify t:
theconstructionprocesses used. This visualexamination identifiedweaknesses
in the design, helped determine the type of tests that could be used to qualify
the part,and provided information necessary to establish process controls.
Additional engineering tests, both environmental and electrical, provided the
information as feedback to the vendor for product improvement. This process
of iteration varied in magnitude for different types of components. Parts
like resistors and some condensors required little or no development activity,
_ as only the type of component and the vendor needed to be _elected. At the
: other extreme, the semiconductor components required development activity
that laste J, well into the design and production of the Block II computer.
The most prominent example of the activity involved in component selection
and the value of standardization in minimizing t"e activity required was ther
development of the integrated circuit NOR gate. The Block I logic design
was accomplished with only one type. The initial Block II design also used
one type but ha,' to be changed to two types as a result of logic coupling in
the substrate between the two independent gates on the single chip. The resulting
types (a dual logic gate and a dual expander gate) differed 0nty in interconnection
pattern on the chip. Therefore the manufacturing and testing of the gates
were otherwise identical, and the engineering effort could be concentrated on
the development of a single device.
v
|
13
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To select standard transistorsand diodes was probably more difficultbecaube
of the wider variety of applications. The NPN transistor was ,_.good example
of this problem because the range of applicationvaried from the very low
current high frequency operation in the oscillatorto the high current memory
drivers and high voltage relay drivers. This range of applications stressed
the state-of-the-artin transistormanufacturing, sinceR required a reasonably
high voltage, high current type transistor. But italso required high gain at
low currents as well as fast switching and low leakage. This range of
applications was satisfied by the development (or selection) of a transistor
chip with adequate electrical characteristics that could be mounted in a
metal-base TO-18 header. The case configuration was selected as the result
of thermal design considerations. The metal-base TO-18 header provided a
package configuration with a low Junction-to-case thermal resistance.
Transistors for a relatively few special circuit applications, such as the
oscillator, which required high gain at low current, could be selected during
computer assembly from the distribution of parameters available in a
procurement lot. This s candardized the transistor production, qualification,
and testing up to module fabrication. To sel.ect a standard PNP transistor
was a problem similar to the NPN. Diodt_,s were standardized to one type
and selected for special application like the matching of forward voltage drop
in the rope sensing circuits.
A few circuit applications could not be met using these standard parts. Most
instances were in the power supplies, where very high power and current
were reqlJired. Comparing the effort of specifying, evaluating, qualifying,
and monitoring a low usage component to that of a high usage component
illustrates the advantages of standardization. As an example, consider the
high current switching transistor used in the pulse width modulated power
supply. This compeuent is a single usage item but had vendor _nd application
troubles several times during the computer production. Individual problems
with this de ,_ceconsumed as much analysis effortas comparable problems
with the high usage component.
14
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3.5 DESIGN QUALIFICATION AND PRODUCTION CONTROLS
To produce a reliable computer and ensure that it has, in fact, met its design
objectives regarding reliability, it was necessary to institute a regime of design
and production qualfflcation, as well as quality and process controls, both for :i
component production and for assembled units. Testing was required at many
levels of assembly to ensure that design objectives and specifications were
met. In addition, all components, modules, and one complete computer were _
subjected to a series of qualification tests. In the case of component
procurement, process controls were established0 but the use of captive or
special high-quality production lines to achieve control was avoided.
3o5ol Component Qualification
Components were qualified differently depending on their criticality and
production maturity. A specification control drawing (SCD) was prepared; a
nominal amount of engineering evaluation was conducted; t)le parts were
released for production procurement; and then subjected to the component
flight qualification program. The se parts had no screen and burn-in requirement
other than that which was specified in the SCD. Critical parts, like the integrated
circuits and high usage transistors, folio(red the more rigorous procedure of
engineering qualification and production screening. The DSKY relay and the
standard diode followed a procedure betweeen these two extremes where the
engineering evaluation and qualification were minimized, but a tightly controlled
screen procedure was introduced as a r_luirement fairly late in the program.
All parts were subjected to testing or data analysis sufficient to establish
that the part was qualified for in-flight operation. The qualification of critical /:
components like the integrated circuits required considerable development,
_. since the technology was new and very little history had been developed that
would lead to a knowledge of the component reliability.
!
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The engineering qualification process of the critical parts began with an
assessmel, of the vendorts ability to supplydevices, the institution of component
standardization in designs, the generation of specification control drawings
and the preliminary study of device failure modes. Qualification procurements
that supplied parts for the engineering qualification testing and engineering
evaluations established confidence in the manufacturerts device processing
and provided data on the device failure modes. Conclusions from the failure
mode analyses were supplied to the manufacturer who then applied corrective
action. This cyclic procedure was continued until the most obvious problems
were eliminated. Knowledge of the failure modes and methods of exciting the
failure modeswereused to design the test environments and rejection criteria
of the component screening procedures.
The design of the qualification testing procedure considered the conditions of
the component application and the most likely failure mechanisms. Because
these tests used small sample sizes, approximately 100 from each
manufacturer, only those mechanisms with a reasonably high probability of
excitation could be detected, even though the tests and failure analysis were
carefully conducted. It _',as also extremely important thvt all qualification
and engineering testing be perYormed on devices fabricated from processes
as near identical to computer production as possible. The qualification method
that was used subjected the devices from various vendors to environmental
extremes beyond usage conditions in an attempt to identify failure modes that
could occur in normal applications. This method, commonly called the step
stress technique, was used in most cases but, since the same lot of devices
was subjected to different stress levels serially, care had to be exercised in
the analysis of failures in order to deter'mine which test condition caused the
failure. Based on the results of step stress tests, vendors were selected,
and test conditions for screen and burn-in were verified.
16
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" 3.5.2 Production Procurement
Engineering qualification and eva:uation tests determined those vendors capable
of supplying the semiconductor part without serious reliability problems.
Qualification tests alone were insufficient to determine the ability of a vendor
to control his process and continue to deliver a quality product. Large volume
production procurement of a high reliability part requires continuous monitoring
• and process control to insure that the quality demonstr_.ted in the qualification
.... t tests is maintained during the production cycle. The requirement for this
continued monitoring of vendor quality and processes was writt(_n into the" "
procurement and processing specifications.
A Flight Processing Specification (FPS) was developed in response to apparent
and real reliability needs. The need for the FPS or its equivalent evolved
from a great deal of data and alsj from sobering history. At the outset of
the program there were many component problems. One instance occurred
when the reliability group stated that some parts should not be used in
f=hricating computers. However, because of production schedule pressures,
the faulty components were used, and, as predicted, the modules with these
defective parts developed failures and had to be scrapped. This constant
conflict between production schedules and reliability required that the reliability
be better defined with aquantitative measure of the quality before the component
was released to production. A reliability specification similar to the SCD
was required. Then, the quality of parts, on a lot basis, could be evaluated
from quantitative data. The FPS became the tool that generated quantitative
data for determining the quality of a lot of components. It became apparent
after considerable experience that the FPS forced component part process
controt without explicitly stating it, while the NASA quality specification* stated
process control without the ability to enforce it. That is, the NASA quality
° specification required that processes would be documented and not changed
i i i IlL II ll| I
* NPC 9.00-3 "The Quality Program Provision for Space System Contracts°t,
• April 1969.
I
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Iwithout approval. However the FPS provided vendor motivation because lots
would be rejected, if the vendor lost control of the process in such a way that
the change was reflected in the visual inspection of product quality.
From a position of technical director for the APOLLO system, the only means
available to ensure the required reliability was to impose the flight process
specifications as a contractual requirement. One benefit of this requirement
was that the APOLLO managers became aware of component reliabi?ity and
actually used the data as a quantitative tool in the management decisions.
- Th_main purpose of _PS was to establish a firm non-varying procedure
that would provide data whose significance could be easily understood. One '
major drawback in most reliability procedures is that without a firm non-varying
procedure, it becomes impossible to assess the importance of isolated failures
or component anomalies. There must be complete knowledge of the order of
testing, the method of testing, and the method of reporting failures to evaluate
the significance of th,; single failure.
Another side effect was briefly discussed previously. APOLLO experience
showed that component reliability could be compromised when a higher priority
was placed on production schedules, and there was no requirement for
documentation that identified the compromise. The reliability required by
the NASA quality specification, although imposed upon the contractorp did not
provide the detailed rel_ ability procedures necessary to make the requirement
effective. This is not a criticism of the NASA quality specification. It would
be impossible to write a specification that would detail all things for all
components. The details of a general specification are the responsibility of
the prime contractors. The flight processing specification did indeed contain
the detailed description of how to execute the requirements of the NASA quality
specification.
_n general the FPS approach turned out to be such an iron clad document that
no deviation wa3 possible without a waiver. Although a deluge of controversy
18
1975004273-021
m.... followed, and pressdre was applied to loosen the requirer.ents, it was felt
_at every conceivable effort should be expended to provide highest possible
quality components for production. A good procedurej therefore, would
highlight component problems and not success. If the FPS was to be a good
management tool, the deviations and problems must appear for management
decision vi_ the waiver route. In contrast, loosening the requirements would
create fewer waivers and would create the condition where the requirement
for reliability was paid for, but not documented, and not necessarily realized.
The waiver, indicating the lack of reliability, became part of the data package
1 for a computer and provided documentation for judging the reliability of the
c_omputer years after the components were test@d.
In the flight processing procedure, the devices, procured by lots, _roceed
through the screen and burn-in test sequence to determine whether the lot is
qualified for flight. That is, the FPS procedure is a lot-by-lot flight qualification
in contrast to the more normal procedure, where a part or vendor is qualified
by testing a typical production run rather than depending upon process control
to ensure that the quality is maintained.
After completion of screen and burn-in tests, the lot is stored until failure
analysis is completed. After failed units are catalogued, analyzed, and classified
to complete the lot assessment, a written report is prepared and, if the lot
passed, the devices that passed all tests are identified with anew part number
as a flight qualified part and sent to module assembly. A semiconductor part
with the flight qualification part number is the only part that can be used in
flight qualified computer assemblies. From failure analysis, rejected parts
proceed to reject storage, where they will be available for future study. Failed
lots are rejected, unless special analysis and consideration qualifies the part
for flight computer production by waiver. The waiver was required to be
authorized by NASA and to accompany the computer as part of the data package.
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The accumulated data, from the screen and burn-in sequences and failure
analysis, were used to evaluate vendor production capability, device quality,
reliability, and continued status as a qualified supplier.
In particular, the flight process specifications specify the following: ;
1. The operational stress, environmental stress, and the test
sequence. Thi_ testing procedure is referred to as the screen !i_
and burn-in process.
2. The electrical parameter tests to be performed during the screen
and burn-in procedure.
3. Definitions of failures. Failures have been defined as catastrophic,
several categories of noncatastrophico and induced.
4. Disposition of failures. The conditions are defined for removing
failures from the screen and burn-in procedure and forwarding
them to failure analysis or storage if failure analysis is not
necessary.
5. Failure mode classification. Failure modes are classified in groups
acco_'ding to screenability and detectability of the failure mode.
6. Maximum acceptable number of failures per classification.
7. Maximum acceptable number of failures for non-electrical tests
such as leak test, lead fatigue, etc.
8. A report for each flight qualified lot. The report must contain
the complete history of the lot with the specific data and analysis
required for flight qualification.
2O
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9. Rejection criteria for internal visual inspection. They are applied
by _he device manufacturer during a 100% preseal inspection for
removal of defective parts, and by the customer on a sample basis
as a destructive test for lot acceptance as part of the requirements
of the FPS.
3.5.3 Production Process Controls
Strict process controls are used throughout procurement and assembly." The
component procurement processes include the identificationof critical
processes and the establishment of methods for process control. Assembly
processes likewelding,wirewrapping, and pottingare specifiedand are under
tight control. As an example, in the case of welding all lead materials are
controlled. The weld setting of the welding machine is specified for every
set of materials to be welded, and the in-process inspection procedures are
established. Periodic qualitycontrol inspections are made on each welding
machine toverif_,thatthe machine and the operator are producing weld joints
thatcan pass destructive-typetests.The material, size°and shape of electronic
component leads are standardized where possible without sacrificing the
reliabilityof the component. The standard lead materials used are kovar,
dumet, and nickel. The interconnect;.onwiring is nickel, thus limiting the
number of differentkinds of weld jointsthat must be made during assembly.
ii_ The fact thatthe process of welded interconnectionlends itselfto tightcontrol
was one of the primary reasons for itsuse in the APOLLO computer design.
3.5.4 Final Acceptance Tests
Final scceptance procedures were designed to test the functional capability
of the computers and DKSYS inadditiontosubjectingthe assemblies to stresses
i thatwould excite potentialfailuremechanisms. These test procedures were
" used for all testing whether the computer was being sold off,returned for
repair,etc. The testconditionswere not to be exceeded for any flightcomputer.
21
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lThe final assembly was subjec:ed to extreme vibration, temperature, and I
voltage that were in excess of the maximum mission requirements. The modules
are subjected to temperature _ycling, operational tests under thermal extreme,
and in some cases operational vibration tests to detect design and workmanship
defects. Some of the tests that were specified initially were changed to increase
their effectiveness as a screen. The history of vibration testing as applied
to the detection of component contamination represents an example of how
the procedures were changed to increase the effectivity.
Briefly, the history of vibration testing starts with sine vibration that was
changed to random. Later the vibration axis of the computer was changed to
increase the sensitivity to logic gate contamination, and finally operational
vibration of individual logic modules was introduced. The computer long-term
aging test is an example of decreasing the requirement, since the test was
not contributing significantly to the screening of potential failures. The Block
I long-term aging required 200 hours operating time before sale of a computer.
In Block It the requirement was reduced to 100 hours, since the experience
during the Block I testing and in field operations indicated that no potential
failure mechanisms were being detected by the test.
4. PROJECT EXPERIENCE
The preceding sections have been concerned with matters of design and
specification of the AGC. This section treats problems with actual components
or entire computers after the design and specification stage. The first part
deals with problems uncovered in the manufacturing process; the second, with
problems uncovered in the field.
4.1 MANUFACTURING PROBLEMS
The manufacturing problems during the development and production phase of
the program were primarily concerned with obtaining or maintaining a
1'
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component qualitylevelthatmightmight beconsideredbeyond thestate-of-the-
f artforeven high-reliabilitycomponents. Some problems were caused b the
component designor the manufacturingprocesses. Other probtems were the
resultof a discrepancy between the component applicationand itsdesign :i
characteristics. The former were usually detected by means of the FPS; the
latter,duringcomputer assembly and test.
4.1.1 Component Defects
The types of component quality problems experienced during, _roduction can ._
be illustratedby problems wi_ the switching diode, the two switching
transistors, the NOR gate, and the relays used in the DSKY. i
-(
4.1.1.1 Diodee
Three major problems with the switching diode were: junction surface
instabilitiesdetectedby increases in reverse leakagecurrent,intermittent
short circuits caused by loose conducting particles entrapped within the
package, and variationinforward voltagedrop.
4.1 .2 Transistors
All significant transistor problems were related to the internal leads and lead
bonds. They were: _purple plague" which results in open bonds caused by
aluminum rich, gold-aluminum intermetallic; a time-dependent failure mode _.
resulting from motion in the aluminum lead wire when the transistor was _:
switched on and off at a relatively slow rate; and occasional die-attach problems
that caused difficulty in applications that required low thermal resistance for
proper heat conduction.
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4.1.1.3 Block II F1ztrack Dual NOR Gate
The three major problems with the _dal NOR gate were package leaks and
leak testing; open bonds caused by a gold rich, aluminum-gold intermetallic;
and shorting caused by loose conducting particles.
The problem with loose conducting particles in the logic gate is of special
inter_t. It developed in severity throughout the production cycle. The change
in severity of the problem was due in part to an increased awareness of the
problem, and in part as a result of corrective action to alleviate some poor
die attach probl_ms. The corrective action was a harder die scrub during
die attach that resulted in gold "pile up" around the chip. The "pile up" would _
break loose thus becoming a source of conductive particles within the package.
Other sources are pieces of lead :_aterial, gold-tin solder from the cover
sealing process and chips of silicon. _
The corrective a_tions to solve the contamination problems started by •
introchtcin_ vendor internal visual inspection changes in December 1966. By
.August 1967 MIT/DL had complete_ a study on the use of X-Rays as a screen _
aud had attempted to change the FPS to provide for a 100-perce] tt X-Ray screen.
The change was not processed until August 1968 because of many debates
about the effectiveness of the screen. To illustrate this lack of an agreement,
the following i_. a quote from one published memo: ttto perform 100-percent
:K-Ray examination of several thousand flatpacks, looking for slight anomalous
conditions indicated by white or greyish spots oz_ the film, is not conducive to
good efficiency". This attitude prevailed in management, until it became obvious
that the time constur.ed in debugging computers with intermittent failures during
vibration was not cor, ducive to good efficiency either. When this became obvioue,
it was almost too late to X-Ray screen because most of the lots were in module
assembly. However, the few remaining lots were processed through X-Ray,
and the FPS was changed to specify the procedure.
24
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The only remaining corrective action possible was the introduction of a module
vibl ation test with the capability of detecting transient failures induced by
mobile conducting particles. This module vibration procedure that was
inti-oduced in the early fall 1968 was effective, since no more failures occurred
during computer vibration, but it was also cgstly and time consuming. The
gross failure rate during module vibration was lower for those modules using
!
a high percentage of X-Rayed lots, however an analysis which should determine
i
the effectiveness of X-Ray screen has not been completed. j
7. j
4.1.2 Design Defects
This section deals with manufactur_xlg problems that were the result of marginal
design or component application, in particular, the type of design problem
that _zasn't detected during the engineering or qualification tests cf
preproduction hardware. Although there were relatively few of these problems°
they were of interest because they illustrate where engineering analysis or
testing to worst case conditions did not excite the latent failure mechanism.
The randomness of the variables that trigger the failure masked the failure
mode during all the preproduction and qualification tests.
4.1.2.1 E-Memory
A complicated problem developed when there were several failures of the
erasable memory modules due to breaks in the #38 copper wire used for
internal wiring of the core stacks and from the core stack to module pins.
Analysis of the breaks concluded that they occurred when the wire was subjected
to tensile or fatigue stresses caused by excessive motion of the core stack
and module pins within the potting materiM during vibration testing.
25
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' 4.1.2.2 Diode Switching
Another problem was that of diode turn-on time in the rope modules caused
by the fact that static matching of the forward voltage drop was insufficient
and dynamic matching was required to reduce the variation in turn-on time
between matched diodes.
, 4.1.2.3 Logic Gate
The "Blue Nose" problem is a component design problem of special interest.
, It occurs because a fundamental characteristic of the component was not
considered in its applications, The characteristics of the isolation regions
of the integrated circuit NOR gate caused the problem becat_se: (1) the
behavior of the isolation regions was not understood during the design, and
(2) the engineering ev_uations were not detailed enough to expose the existence
of marginal conditions. The problem developed late in Block I production in
; the interface between the computer and computer test set. Figure 2 shows
the circuit schematic, and the parasitic elements that caused the problem
• are shown as dottedlines.Whel_V o risestoabo,1_2 volts,thediode-capacitor
couplingoccursthroughtheresistorsubstrate,diodesD 1 and D 2,totheunused
transistor.This couplingis a feedback path thatslows the pulse risetime
as indicated.The risetimewillbe afunctionofthe gainoftheunused transistor
as well as a functionof therepetitionrateof thedriver. Diode D 2 behaves
as a capacitorthatcharges rapidlybut dischargesslowly,sincethe reverse
. impedance of D 1 isinseries. The firstpulse of a pulse trainwillbe slow,
and all succeedingones faster,if the period between the pulses is small
;
compared to the discharge time of D 2. Sincethemagnitude of the effectis
also dependent upon the gain of the unused transistor, it can be seen why
•engineering tests may not detect the problem. The condition required to detect
_' the slow rise time is one where the transistors are high gain. and the rise
time of the pulse is critical yet the data rate is low. Late in production a
shift in the distribution of the transistor gain to a higher average gain caused
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this problem to be detected and become very troublesome. The most expeditious
solution at that point in production was to select the low gain components for
use in the critical locations. Another possible solution, that could not be as
easily phased into production, was to ground the unused inputs of the gate.
"Blue Nose" is an expression in the parlance of the MIT logic designers
indicating a logic gate used without power applied, such as a _ate used to
increase the fan-in. It takes its name from the graphical symbol used to
denote it.
4.2 SYSTEM INTEGRATION EXPERIENCE
The system integration problems, that were experienced during GN&C and
spacecraft checkout, were the most troublesome during computer dcvelopment.
As operator experience developed, and as the software and hardware anomalies
were eliminated, checkout ran quite smoothly. Since transient or non-repeating
type anomalies were the most common, it was extremely difficult to analyze
the symptoms and satisfactorily explain the anomaly. Although there were
re,my failures,and all had to be explained, there were only a few that were
indications of design faults or software bugs. In general, many of the faults
were the result of electrical transients of many types. Power-line transients
and transient behavior of subsystems during power up and power down were
the most common. The interference on signal lines, induced by operation of
various switch contacts, was the result of marginal shielding and grounding.
In some cases these transient signals were due to coupling within the computer
between signal interface and other logic signals. All of these electrical
interference problems indicated that the early computers and interface cabling
were more sensitive to interference than desirable, even though the system
would pass the standard EMI susceptibility specifications. A series of design
changes, related to shielding and grounding, eliminated electrical interference
problems except those induced by temporary power failures that would case
a V-fail alarm and a software restart.
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4.2. i Example -- Software Problem
A problem, characterized by a TC Trap alarm during spacecraft testing, is
typical of the type that is extremely difficult to analyze. When the actual
cause of the alarm was determined, it was concluded that it was a software
problem, even though the initial symptoms misled the investigators into
suspecting noise as the cause. In fact, it was erroneously concluded after a
brief analysis that there was no software bug. Later, after all possible hardware
noise conditions had been eliminated, a software interaction was detected
between test programs loaded into erasable memory and the executive activity
which was located in the fixed memory.
4.2.2 Example -- Hardware Problems
- There was a class of integration problems that resulted from the lack of
understanding about how the computer and other subsystem interfaces operated
during the power-up sequences. For example:
1. When the uplink equipment was turned on, or in some cases when
turned off, the equipme,_t would emit one or more pulses. These
pulses would remain in the AGC register and would cause the first
data transmission to be in error, unless the register was cleared
before transmission.
2. When the computer was turned on, it would indicate a warning
alarm for as long as 20 seconds and would trigger the spacecraft
master caution and warning.
3. When the computer was switched between standby and operate, a
p_wer transient internal to the computer would modulate the clock
• sync signals to the spacecraft. Sometimes the modulation would
cause the down telemetry to drop out of sync for approximately
• one second.
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These problems were relatively minor in terms of corrective action required
but were troublesome to analyze. The corrective action taken was to modify
the operating procedures and update the ICD to identify the signal behavior
during the transient conditions.
4.2.3 Example -- Mission Problems
4.2.3.1 Uplink Problem -- APOLLO 6 Mission
There was one interference type problem that occurredduring the APOLLO
6 mission. The AGC generated frequent uplink alarms both during and in the
absence of ground initiated upltnk data. Interference conditions made the [
I
process of loading data into the computer very difficult. The alarms were
determined to be the result of noise on the uplink interface wiring that the
computer would interpret as signal, since the noise amplitude was equal to
or greater than signal.
The occurrence of noise during the mission initiated an intensive investigation
that not only located the source of the noise in the spacecraft but also the
sensitivity of the routing and shielding of ".he spacecraft cabling used on this
interface. The umbilical input lines, used during prelaunch checkout and
connected in parallel with the uplink irzput to the AGC, were determined to be
the lines that were susceptible to the interfering noise. After launch these
unterminated lines remained connected to the umbilical and also passed through
several connectors within the spacecraft.
4.2.3.2 APOLLO 11 And 12 Examples
Both APOLLO 11 and APOLLO 12 missions had anomalies that are of interest.
During the lunar landing phase of APOLLO 11, the computer inthe LM signaled
an alarm condition several times. These alarms were an indication to the
astronauts that the computer was eliminating low priority tasks because it
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, was carrying a computational load Jr, excess of its capacity. The computer
was designed and programmed with the capability of performing the high
priority tasks first and causing low priority tasks to wait for periods of reduced
activity. Several times during the landing the computer had to eliminate low
priority tasks and signaled the astronauts of this fact via the alarms.
The overload condition resulted from the fact that the rendusvgas radar was
on but was not in the GN&C mode. In this mode the radar snl_te data was
being sent to the GN &C with a phase different than during normal operation.
The analog to digital converters in the GN&C system could not lock onto the
angle signals. The resulting hvnt or dither caused a maximum data rate into
the AGC counters that consumed more than 15_ of the computational time.
The loss of computational time was sufficient to overload the computer several
times during the landing.
The APOLLO 1 _, anomaly was attributed to lightning striking the vehicle during
the first few seconds of launch. The lightning induced temporary power failures
in the fuel cell system• The transfer to the backup battery power resulted in
a power transient and a condition of V-Fail in the AGC. Subsequent tests on
the computer indicated no damage or loss of E-memory contents during the
lightning or power transients.
4.3 FIELD FAILURE HISTORY
In addition to the problems discussed in the last section which were solved
without modifying the computer hardware, there was a class of fai!uresm the
solution of which required modifications to the computer itself. Both design
_ _changes and computer repair _ituations are included.
In all, there were 16 computer failures and 36 DSKY failures of equipment onb
flight status which are of primary interest. The period of time impiied by
"on flight status" is defined as that part of the computer's life cycle which
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begins with the date of acceptance by NASA as determined by the Material i
Inspection and Receiving Report (DD-250) and ends for the following reasons: !
1. End of period of compilation 31 Dec. 1970.
2. Completion of flight mission.
3. Removal from flight status for other reasons (exposure to
qualification environment, allocation to ground function not under
quality control surveillance, etc.).
During this period of flight status and during the acceptance testing prior to
acceptance by NASA, quality control surveillance was maintained, failure
reports were written on all indications of anomalous behavior, and a record
of operating time was accumulated. The failure experience during the factory
acceptance testing was summarized in the previous section. The failures of
primary interest for this section of the report are those with a "Cause"
classification of "Part" in the failure reporting system. Failures with a"C ause"
classification such as "Secondary", "Induced", "Procedure Error", "Test
Error", "Hand_Ang"0 etc. are not considered here. Table I is a breakdown of
the total number of failure reports written into these classifications. The
DSKY failures are less interesting and are not covered in detail since DSKY
components are of a largely obsolete technology (pushbutton switches, indicator
panels, and relays).
There were 42 computers manufactured and delivered for flight status. Failure
history has been accumulated in these systems. The first of these was delivered
in the Fall of 1966 and the last one in the Spring of 1969. See Table II for the
history of time on flight status for each of these computers.
Of the 16 failures, 4 are of particular interest since they are of the type for
which no corrective action was taken. A complete breakdown of the failures
is presented in Table lit. The first four are the failures counted in the
determination of an MTBF f_r the computer or for the prediction of a mission
32
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TABLE 1
AFR CAUSE CLASSIFICATION
¢
FAILURE "CAUSE" CLASSIFICATION AGC DSKY "
Development type dated before 1967 252 67
Procedure and testing errors 199 32
. Induced by GSE and Cabling 150 28
Handling and Workmanship 336 42
Electrical Part 182 237
Factory acceptance testing 166 201
On flight status 16 36
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success probability. The other 12 include 10 failures due to contamination in
the flatpacks which were detected when a flight status computer was returned
to the factory and subjected to a vibration screen more severe than the _
acceptance level and an order of magnitude higher than flight levels. These
10 are not counted since failures indicated during those factory test
environments which are more severe than normal mission environments are
not counted against the computer for purposes of reliability prediction unless
they corroborate field failures. The 1lth failure (also not counted) was the
result of the diode design problem mentioned in the previous section. All
flight hardware which is sensitive to this design problem has been purged of
the defect. The 12th failure (also not counted) was a transistor bond failure
at the post. This was an aluminum wire interconnect bonded to a gold plated
post (not the transistor chip) which was open. Analysis indicated there was
no evidence of a bond ever having been ma0e between the wire and the post.
None of the previous testing had caused the contact to open. The computer
had been on flight status for over a year without indication of this defect and ,
had been returned to the factory as part of a retrofit program to make an
unrelated design change. After this retrofit, the failure was first detected
when the computer was operating at the upper temperature limit of the thermal
cycle. The failure was not repeatable, but after further diagnostic vibration
and thermal cycling, it was again detected and located.
The population of DSKYs considered on flight status was 64 with 36 failures
as noted previously. The most interesting class of failures in the DSKY is
that which resulted from contamination in the relays_ During the manufacturing
cycle special vibration screens were developed for the component level during
FPS processing, for the module level, and finally for the DSKY level of
assembly. The experience of continued contamina+,ion failures during vibration
testing at each level of assembly is a positive indication that the screens
were not 100 percent effective. In addition, there was an indication of
contaminatiGn in the main panel DSKY of the APOLLO 12 command module
just before launch. Contamination of any one of 108 relays that operate the
34
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electroluminescent panel can cause the panel to read all eights while the relay
contacts are shorted by the contamination. The APOLLO 12 DSKY experienced
this condition. During the mission there was no further indication of failure.
Since that experience, asn, all test program has been develgped which will
cycle all relays and hopefully clear a failure it it were to occur during flight.
In summary, the contamination in flatpacks and DSKY relays has continued to
plague the APOLLO program. As discussed under the Section on Manufacturing
Problems, the me_hods for screening components were modified during the
L_roduction cycle in order to increase screening effectiveness, In the case of
the flatpaCks, the computers at the end of the production run had the most
effective screens which included 100-percent X-Ray of the components,
monitored vibration at the module level, and operating vibration at the computer
level. Earlier computers had various combinations of these tests but mos_
• of them had only operating vibration at the cemputer level. Even this test
was changed to increase the effectiveness at about the mid-point of the
production cycle. Experience has shown both for the DSKY and the AGC that
a field return which is subjected to the latest methods of module vibration
will very likely have failures due to contamination. One of the computers,
after successfully flying a mission, had a contamination failure when it was
returned to the factory and subjected to the vibration test. Notice that there
is no evidence of contamination failures in flight.
The total history of the computers indicates there have been 58 APOLLO
Failure Reports (AFR) resulting from contamination in flatpacks. Most of
these occurred when the computer was being sold off initially. The 10 failures
discussed previously occurred when computers were returned to the factory
and were subjected to the latest vibration screens. These 10 were not indicative
of any field failures. Only AFR 17275 (listed in Table IH)was related to a
failure during operation in the field and was verified by subsequent factory
" testing.
t
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TABLE II
AGC CENSUS
S/N DD 250 DATE END DATE OP TIME HOURS
16 (C-l) 7/25/66 8/23/67 1176.8
18 (C-4) 10/20/66 5/16/67 274.5
19 (C-5) 11/19/66 11/27/68 711.7
20 (C-6) 11/26/66 2/22/69 722.4
22 (C-2) 8/15/66 7/31/67 122.3
23 (C-7) 12/7/67 4/26/68 107o5
24 (C-8) 2/7/67 12131170 862.0
25 (C-10) 6/27/67 11/20/69 412.8
26 (C-12) 6/24/67 12/31/70 951.9
27 (C-13) 8/4/67 10/22/68 1545.8
28 (C-14) 8/23/67 12/31/70 713.9
29 (C-9) 4/5/67 12/31/70 831.8
30 (C-11) 6/10/67 1/22/68 987.7
31 (C-15) 10/12/67 5/23/69 1322.2
32 (C-16) 9/1/67 3/7/69 1613.0
33 (C-17) 10/2/67 12/27/68 1471.4
34 (C-18) 10/11/67 11124/69 1530.7
35 (C-19) 9/6/68 12131/70 450.4
36 (C-20) 4/30/68 12131170 760.4
37 (C-21) 2/8/68 3/13/69 1159.5
38 (C-22) 3/29/68 12/31/70 890.9
39 (C-23) 1/17/69 12/31/70 234.8
40 (C-24) 1/19/68 5/26/69 1206.5
41 (C-25) 12/15/67 12/31/70 771.2
42 (C-26) 1/16/68 7/21/69 1314.4
43 (C-27) 2112/68 12131/70 591.6
44 (C-28) 3/25168 7/24169 1144.9
45 (C-29) 2/26/68 12/31/70 1245.9
46 (C-30) 8/6/68 4/17170 971.3
47 (C-31) 1/16/69 12/31/70 205.6
48 (C-32) 4/10/68 12/31/70 312.1
49 (C33) 8/6/68 12131/70 1064.8
50 (C-34) 7/25/68 12/31/70 367.2
51 (C-35) 4/29/69 12/31/70 207.0
52 (C-36) 3/31/69 12/31/70 302.8
53 (C-37) 9/25/68 4117170 524.8
54 (C-38) 2/10/69 12/31/70 377.1
55 (C-39) 3126/69 12131170 0.0
56 (C-40) 5/6/b9 12131170 217.8
57 (C-41) 9/10/69 12/31/70 254.2 " i
58 (C-42) 5/13/69 12/31/70 91.2
59 (C-43) 5115169 12/31/70 154.9
36
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5. RELIABILITY STATISTICS :_
In general the life cycle of the computer includes assembly and test as part
of the manufacturing cycle, followed by GN&C system assembly and test (which
is completed when the system is sold to NASA by means of DD250), a period
of storage which includes t_sting to insure operability as a ready spare, _
installation into the spacecraft followed by a lengthy cycle of prelaunch
checkout, and finally a mission. The life cycle is completed for the Command
J
i; Module system at splash down. In case of the Lunar Module, the cycle is _
completed when the operation of the ascent stage of the LM is terminated. In _!
"_ the previous section this cycle was divided into twomajor periods: first prior :
• to DD250, and second the remaining period defined as flight status. This
latter period for each production computer is tabulated L'_ Table H and is __
• used for determining the reliability statistics which are summarized in Table
IV. The column labeled Flight is that portion of Column D which computers
have spent in flight.
This table classifies the time computers have spent in each environment and
identifies each failure with the environment which induces the failure. The
failure environments include: a. aging time, which is the total time since
sell-off to NASA; b. vibration, which results from shipment, handling and flight;
c. thermal cycle, which results from the normal turning power off and on; d.
operation, ""hich is the accumulated time the computer was operated. The
aging time and operating time are derived from Table II. Vibration time is
estimated from the records for shipment, handling° etc. The number of thermal
cycles is estimated from operating history recorded in each computer°s data
package.
•
The failure modes listed in Table IIl are catagorized in Table TV according
_ f ' to the type of environment which induces that type of failure. The two logic
I
i
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- gate failure modes are time dependent but reasonably independent of
temperature for the range of normal operation; therefore,these are assigned
to the aging time column. The contamination failureis assigned to vibration.
The transformer failure was an open winding which, due to the potted
construction,isstressed by temperature cycling. The failurewas intermittent
under theconditionsof computer warm up. As indicatedthere are no failures
which are classifiedunder operation since the failurerates associated with
these four failuremodes are not accelerated by the additional environments
of temperatures, current, voltage, etc.which are imposed by operation.
The MTBF and success probabilitiesare calculated as indicatedin Table IV
J
for both CM and LM computers of the APOLLO 14 mission. For each computer,
the probability of success (Ps) of the mission is the joint probability that :
both computers survive allenvironments.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
i
From the information in Table IV and the parts count of Table V, the failure t
rate of various components can be ca:culated. The resulting numbers may
be of interest,but of more interestare some conclusions that can be derived
from the APOLLO experience.
1. The composite MTBF for the computer, when operating in the
mission environments for an Apollo Command Module flightof
200 hours, can be computed from the results of Table IV (Ps =
0.995). This MTBF is 40,000 hours. If computed in the more _I
conventional fashion by charging the four failures against the total
computer hours (670,000 hours), the result is 180,000 hours. Total
. clock time is used in this calculation of computer hours since
none of the failure modes experienced are accelerated by computer :
, operation.
.-
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TABLE V
AGC ? ARTS COUN T
.:
NAME TOTAL GENERIC TYPE SUB-TOTAL
i i • i Jl
Capacitor s 2 21
• Solid Tantalum 200
: Ceramic . ...
Glr.s._ Dielectric 10
Resistors 2918
Wir_ Wound I I 1
_. Tin Oxide Film 2807
Transistors 550
NPN Switching 443
PNP Switching 94
Power 13
Diodes 3325
Switching 3300
Zener 25
Transformers 123
Pulse 120
Signal 3
Inductors 108
Thermistors 4
Cores,
Magnetic 35840
Ferrite 32768
Tape Wound 3072
Integrated
Circuits 2826
Du_ Nor Gate 2460
D_al Expander 334
Sense Amplifier 32
Connectors -
Pins 19,957
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2. It can be concluded from the material presented that the computer
failure rate is independent of whether the computer is operating
_ ornot. This conclusion is based on an understanding of the physics
• of the failure modes experienced to date. It is also a result of a
_|
very careful thermal and electrical design which constrains
operating conditions of the components t,o very reasonable limits.
3. A fairly reasonable development period and a reasonably large
number of flight computers were necessary in order to shake down
the prol_tems and develop confidence in the reliability statistics.
4. Considerable effort was expended to make the various methods of
testing and screening used in the APOLLO program as effective
as possible. Even so, they were not 100-percent effective for
many of the prevalent even so, they were not 100% effective for
many of the prevalent failure modes (bonds and contamination) in
components being produced.
5. Contamination material in electronic components (flatpacks and
relays) has shown a tendency to move around under fairly severe
vibration, but has shown no tendancy to float freely when at zero
gravity.
6. There are long life type failure modes which are hard to predict
initially and even harder to screen out of the hardware. Therefore
long-term missions which require a reasonably high probability
of success must depend upon techniq-_ of re4undancy and
reconfiguration.
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